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This paper examines the empirical evidence underlying Senegalese household 
decision making on children occupations. Using household survey data we test 
the impact of household and individual characteristics on children activities, 
focusing on three mutually exclusive ones: school, housework and work. The 
originality of  this paper is to highlight the importance of the opportunity costs of 
schooling (proxied by the presence of basic and facilities) on children activities. 
The paper also investigates the impact of female bargaining power on children 
activities. Such a power affects positively and significantly children schooling 
with  a noteworthy gender bias favorable to boys. 
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It is increasingly admitted that building new schools, improving school quality or 
subsidizing schooling are not sufficient to improve school attendance and/or curb child labor. If 
one aims at attaining these objectives, it is also important to understand what affects parents’ 
decision to send their children to school or to work. A number of previous studies have 
investigated the relationship between households’ decisions and children activities, with mixed 
conclusions. Findings on this issue likely vary across countries. 
This paper examines the empirical evidence underlying Senegalese household decision 
making of whether to send children to work or school. The aim is to identify the key 
determinants of children’s activities in Senegal.  Interest in this issue is twofold. First, it is 
widely admitted that a low level of human capital constitutes an impediment to economic 
growth. Improving human capital stock is thus a key condition for developing countries in order 
to address the growth challenge. Second, Senegal is committed to meet the Millennium 
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Development Goals by 2015 (see UN, 2003). However, the trend towards these goals does not 
look optimistic. The 2000 MICS survey (DPS, 2000) indicates that primary-school enrolment 
rates are still modest: 53.9 % for boys and 44.6 % for girls. Meantime, about 40 % of boys and 
35 % girls aged 5-15 are economically active. This survey indicates furthermore that children 
are often precociously engaged in the labor market. It is evidenced that about one-third (31 %) 
of working children in Senegal are less than 10 years old. 
The households in which they live determine the ways children spend their time. 
Households, through an internal mechanism, allocate time for different activities among their 
members, and also allocate resources between themselves for consumption, saving and 
investment including human capital formation. Therefore, within that context, children’s 
activities depend heavily on factors that affect household’s constraints, opportunities and 
incentives. Whether children will go to school or not depends on the extent to which households 
require their labor to achieve some level of welfare. 
Theoretical explanations have been given on how households decide children’s 
participation in schooling and labor activities. Basu and Van (1998) state that child participation 
in work activities occurs under the conditions of multiplicity of equilibriums in the labor 
market. In a one-period model, they show that the type of activities that households choose for 
their children are part of any of two stable equilibriums : a high-wage equilibrium in which 
children do not work and a low-wage one in which both adults and children do. Basu and Van 
derive their conclusion from two axioms: the substitution axiom which postulates that child and 
adult labor are perfect substitutes and the luxury axiom which states that the household chooses 
not to send children to work if household income from non-child source is high enough.  
Baland and Robinson (2000) also studied households’ decision mechanism of whether 
to send child to work or to school. In a two-period model taking into account the future returns 
from investment in children education, they demonstrate that parents will choose a socially 
efficient level of child labor if they are not subject to borrowing constraints or if they can make 
a bequest or receive a transfer from their children. But, if parents lack access to the credit 
market or if there is neither transfer nor bequest possibility, they will engage their children in 
the labor market at an inefficiently high level. Baland-Robinson setting with two-sided altruism 
is used by Rogers and Swinnerton (2004) who highlight the relation between children outcomes 
and the level of parental income. Their main finding is that a rise in parental income does not 
always lead to a decrease in child labor.  
Rogers-Swinnerton’s finding suggests that the relationship between child labor and 
parental income is not monotonic. That result is non-consistent with the luxury axiom. 
However, it is supported by some empirical work, which demonstrate that the link between 
child labor and poverty is weak. Ray (2000) and Maitra and Ray (2000) show in a comparative 
study that the effects of household poverty on children activities are not similar across countries. 
They find that the relationships between child labor and household poverty and between child 
schooling and household poverty are indeed strongly confirmed by Pakistani data. In contrast, 
such relationships are much weaker in Peru and in Ghana. Even in the Peruvian case, data fail to 
detect any significant association between household poverty and child activities. They also find 
that the impact of adult wages on child activities differs across these countries. Changes in adult 
wages have a larger impact in Pakistan than in Peru or in Ghana. Cockburn (2001) also casts 
nuances on the relationship between household welfare and child labor or schooling decisions 
(see also Ravallion and Wodon, 2000; Canagarajah and Coulombe, 1997). He argues that such a 
relation depends considerably on child labor returns and on the composition of household asset 
portfolios. Using multinomial analysis of data from rural Ethiopian households, he demonstrates 
that different physical assets have different effects on child labor supply according to their 
degree of substitution. For instance, increasing access to physical assets that require relatively 
more child work, such as small animals, will tend to increase children’s amount of work and 
reduce their schooling and leisure. 
The children’s time allocation may also depend on the access to basic services such as 
water and electricity. The presence of such services in the household decreases the opportunity 
cost of schooling as children are freed from the responsibility fetching water and/or collecting 
wood or charcoal for lighting or cooking. The presence of these services is thus likely to   3
decrease the opportunity cost of schooling, and the policy implication is straightforward. The 
expansion of basic services and facilities could be used in developing countries as an instrument 
for reducing child labor and increasing school attendance. Literature on child labor is quite 
scarce about this subject. Guarcello and al (2004) analyze the impact of the presence of basic 
services (e.g. water and electricity) on child labor in five developing countries (El Salvador, 
Ghana, Guatemala, Morocco and Yemen).  Their main finding is that households having access 
to water and electricity are more likely to send their children to school. Furthermore, Cockburn 
(2001) has found that the distance from the nearest source of water reduces school attendance 
among girls in rural Ethiopia. 
There are also theoretical and empirical studies that emphasize the role of gender 
balance of power within the household on children activities. The basic idea underlying such an 
approach is that men and women may have different preferences. Thus, depending on the 
balance power between them, the household may choose differently. Basu (2001) and Basu and 
Ray (2001) show that children are less likely to work in households where power is well 
balanced between the husband and the wife. Their main finding is that the relationship between 
women’s relative power and child labor is not monotonic and follows an U-shape. In other 
words, as women’s power rises, child labor initially falls but beyond a certain point (too much 
power to the women), it rises again. 
Total household income or gender balance of power are not the unique factors that 
could affect children activities. Recent empirical work has identified other important factors that 
are worth being studied. In particular, households’ socio-economics characteristics (living 
arrangements, living areas, adults employment and educational attainment) and children 
characteristics (age, gender, birth order; etc) are pointed as very determinants on children’s time 
use. 
In this paper, we postulate that children’s activities in Senegal depend on the level of 
household income, household characteristics, the availability of basic services such as access to 
drinkable water or electricity, and on women’s relative power within households. As a proxy of 
women’s power, we use their share of adult total income. We distinguish three types of 
mutually exclusive activities in which children are engaged: attending school, doing housework 
or working. One caveat to this option is that children activities are not always mutually 
exclusive. Children can be jointly engaged in two or three activities at a same time (Maitra and 
Ray, 2000). Nevertheless, we rule out such an eventuality for two reasons. First, as in many 
household surveys, the database we use does not allow to determine whether children combine 
two or more activities. Second, we focus only on children main activity - meaning the activity in 
which they devote the most important part of their time. 
Our estimation framework consists of a multinomial logit model. Such a model is 
largely used in the literature and allows to jointly estimate the equations of the different child 
activities. This approach is preferred to some alternative ones developed in the literature for two 
reasons. First, it takes into account the hypothesis that households’ decisions on the different 
child activities are not independent. Second, it allows to also assume that the decision process 
between these activities is simultaneous (see Dar, Blunch, Kim and Sasaki (2002) for an 
exhaustive analysis of the scopes and drawbacks of most approaches used in the literature). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the estimation 
procedure. Section 3 describes the database used and presents some descriptive statistics. 
Section 4 presents the estimation results and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Model  specification 
The question that our model tries to answer can be expressed as follows: what factors 
affect the probability of a child being observed in one of the following activities: attend school, 
do housework, or work? We assume that children (or more realistically, their parents) choose 
the state that gives them the highest utility among the different choices. This assumption allows 
us to use the multinomial logit model introduced by McFadden (1973). The utility attached to 
each of the alternatives depends upon several exogenous characteristics such as age, household 
income, educational level of the household head, living arrangement, ethnicity, region, etc.   4
More precisely, we assume that individual i chooses alternative j if the associated 
utility, Uij, is the highest of all J alternatives, that is Uij = max{Ui1, … , UiJ}. Obviously, these 
utility levels are not observed and we need to make several assumptions to make this set-up 
operational. Utility level is assumed to have two components: one non-stochastic function of 
observable, µij, and an unobservable error term, εij. From this, it follows that the probability for 
individual i to choose option j can be written as: 
Pij  = P{Uij = max{Ui1, …, UiJ}} 
 =  P{µij + εij > 
kJ k j MAX
=≠ 1,..., ,
 {µik + εik}}      (1) 
The multinomial logit model assumes that all εij are mutually independent with a log 
Weibull distribution (also known as a type I extreme value distribution). The distribution 
function of each εij is given by: 
F(t)= exp{-e
-t}           ( 2 )  
Under these assumptions, it can be shown that 
Pij = 
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The distribution of εij sets the scaling of utility but not the location. To solve this, it is 
common to normalize one of the deterministic utility levels to zero, say µi1 = 0. For our model, 
we normalize the utility level of the alternative “attend school” to 0. We also assume that µij is a 
linear function of observable variables that depend upon the individual. Thus, we can write  
µij = Xi’ βj.  Then, we obtain: 
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This constitutes the multinomial logit model. The probability of an individual choosing 
alternative j is a simple expression of explanatory variables and coefficients β because of the 
convenient assumption made about the distribution of the unobserved errors.   
This multinomial model is estimated by maximum likelihood, where the above 
probabilities enter the likelihood function. The log-likelihood for observation i is 
ij
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The analysis conducted here is mainly descriptive and the results from the reduced-form 
model cannot be interpreted as structural. Some of our coefficients from the explanatory 
variables may suffer from endogeneity problems due to the selection process of unobserved 
background characteristics. Thus, our estimations may reflect both the impact of the variables 
themselves and the potential unobserved innate characteristics. 
 
3.  Description of child labor and school attendance in Senegal 
The data used to analyze the characteristics and the determinants of child activities in 
Senegal are taken from the first “Enquête Sénégalaise Auprès des Ménages”, ESAM-I (DPS, 
1995). ESAM is an Incomes-Expenditures nation-wide survey conducted from March 1994 to 
April 1995 by the Direction de la Prevision et de la Statistique of the Senegalese Ministry of 
Finance. Data were collected on 3300 households from three strata: Dakar (the capital), other 
urban areas and rural areas. ESAM database contains rich information on individual   5
characteristics (age, education, gender, occupation and labor activity, marital status, etc), 
household characteristics (size, structure and composition, living conditions, access to water and 
living areas, etc), budget (consumption, incomes, etc), and wealth (housing, other assets and 
liabilities, etc). Such a database allows us to conduct an analysis on the determinants of 
children’s time allocation in Senegal. The sample considered for this analysis consists of 4951 
children aged between 10 and 15 years. Unfortunately, no information is available about the 
work patterns for younger children. This can represent a limitation for our study but 10 to 15 
year-old children are those who are more likely to work and drop out of school relative to 
younger children. Another limitation of the survey is that it is impossible to determine whether 
children combine school and work. We only know whether the usual activity of the child is 
work, school or another activity. Moreover, we do not have the wage rate of working 
individuals. 
In 1994-95, 22.1 % of 10 to 15 year-old children worked in Senegal, 51.1 % attended 
school and the rest did housework.
1 In urban areas, 10.7 % of children worked whereas 38.2 % 
did in rural areas. School attendance was higher in cities with 65.4 % compared to 30.9 % in 
rural areas. Table 1 presents the distribution of children at school and in the labor force in 1994 
in Senegal. It shows an important gender differential in the different categories of child 
activities. This gender imbalance is particularly pronounced in the rural areas and it is in favour 
of girls only in the category “housework”. Senegalese girls, whatever their age, are more 
involved in household chores than boys both in urban and rural areas. Such an imbalance in 
domestic tasks is typical of developing countries. It is also observed in Pakistan, Peru and 
Ghana by Maitra and Ray (2000) and in Ethiopia by Cockburn (2001). On the other hand, 
Senegalese boys, vis-à-vis girls, are more likely to attend school or to work. Notice that the 
distribution of children between schooling and working activities reverses with age. For older 
boys and girls, labor force participation increases while school attendance decreases. But school 
dropping-out is more pronounced for girls at age 15 in rural areas; their school attendance rate is 
only 8.8 %. This fact may be explained by the practice of early wedding in some rural zones in 
Senegal. Such a practice, widely spread in developing countries (Unicef, 2001; Ndiaye and Sarr, 
1994; and Ceped, 1994), is pointed as one of the main causes of girls’ school non-enrolment or 
dropping-out.  
It is worth analyzing the different activities in which children are involved when they 
are at work. Table 2 presents the different occupations that children have in Senegal when they 
are defined as worker. We have classified the different activities in three main groups. The first 
one is ‘family helper’; it consists of helping one member of the household in his job without 
receiving a wage in counterpart. The second type of work activity is ‘apprentice’: the child is 
presumed to be learning a vocational job but he can sometimes receive presents or pay from his 
trainer. The last category consists of pieceworkers, self-employed or wage earners; we call it 
‘Other’. Table 2 shows that these types of work differ between areas and sex. Most working 
boys are apprentices (70.4 %) in cities while the majority of them work as family helpers in 
rural regions (86.6 %). There are almost no apprentices in the rural sector. Family helper is the 
main type of job in the rural areas because most parents work in the agricultural sector. The 
majority of working girls in the urban areas are classified as ‘other’. 
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of individual and household characteristics 
according to children status (school, housework or work). We see important differences when 
we look at the education level of the household head. A relatively high share of children 
attending school live in a household where the head has a secondary or higher degree. Most 
working children have a household head that has not received any education. There is no 
difference between boys and girls regarding the education of the household head. As noted 
earlier, working children are the oldest on average.  
We have also included four variables describing the living conditions of the household 
and the availability of basic services: direct access to water
2 in the household, the presence of an 
                                                 
1 Children who do not attend to school and do not work are assumed to do housework. 
2 Direct access to water is a dummy variable that is 1 if the main source of drinkable water is an inside tap 
or well, a water seller or a tank truck and zero otherwise.    6
electric or gas cooker, the presence of electric lighting and the average number of persons by 
room in the household. Most of these variables indicate that working (and houseworking) 
children are those who are in households with poor living conditions while those attending 
school have better living standards. Children doing housework are those who live in households 
where the average number of persons per room is the highest.  
Direct access to water is an interesting variable in analyzing the determinants of 
children’s time allocation in Senegal because it has a direct impact on the non-pecuniary cost of 
schooling for children and especially for girls. In traditional Senegalese household, the task to 
fetch the water is devoted to girls. As a result, we can expect that the direct water access 
increase the probability to attend school for children, and especially for girls. The same 
reasoning can apply for the presence of electric lighting or gas/electric cooker.  
We also distinguish some difference according to the ethnic group of the household 
head: the Wolof/Lebu group is over-represented among working children while the Diola are 
over-represented among children attending school.  As noted earlier, working children are 
concentrated in rural areas while the majority of children attending school live in cities. 
Household size is the largest for working boys and for girls attending school.  
The number of workers aged 16 years or more is also included in the model in order to 
know whether adult and child labor are substitutes or complementary. Working children live in 
households where the number of adult workers is the highest on average.  
Table 3 also presents total household income and total income minus children income. 
We see that children income only accounts for a very little part of total household income. The 
share of children income in total income is a bit larger for working children. Household income 
is the lowest for working children and the highest for those attending to school. Finally, Table 3 
shows women’s share of adult income. This turns out to be women’s relative power within the 
household. We notice from this table that working boys and girls are likely to live in households 
with high women’s bargaining power.  
4. Estimation  results 
The multinomial logit model presented here describes how different household and 
individual characteristics influence the probability for a child being observed in one of the three 
following states: attend school, housework or work. The analysis is conducted separately for 




4.1 Coefficient estimates 
Table 4 and 5 present the coefficient estimates from the multinomial logit model for 
boys and girls, respectively.
4 School attendance is the reference category. 
The educational level of the household head is presumed to have important effects on 
children’s time allocation. In fact, highly educated parents are more likely to have more 
information about the return from schooling. Moreover, they can help their children more 
efficiently in their learning process and lower their dropout rate. Results show that the 
probability to do housework or to work decreases significantly when the educational level of the 
household head is high. As predicted, there is a positive relationship between the education of 
the household head and their children. Boys and girls are likely to be less involved in a working 
activity or home tasks as the head of the household is more educated. There are noticeable 
gender differences between the estimates of this effect. 
Age is expected to have a positive impact on the probability to work since older 
children are more likely to help their family in work or to drop out of school following a failure. 
                                                 
3 We performed the Hausman test for the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternative for boys 
and girls and find that this assumption is not rejected for boys whatever the omitted category while the 
assumption is rejected for girls, but only when the “housework” category is omitted.  
 
4 The model also includes 9 regional dummies. Coefficient estimates of these variables are presented in 
the annex. 
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Results confirm this hypothesis. The probability to work or to do housework significantly 
increases as boys or girls get older. Also, children living in rural areas are more likely to work 
and do housework. They have also a lower probability to attend school. 
We have included several variables reflecting the poverty status of the children’s 
household. One is the logarithm of the total household income minus children income. This 
variable (as postulated by the Basu-Van Luxury Axiom) is predicted to have a positive impact on 
schooling since, in the presence of credit constraints, poorer households may lack access to 
credit market in order to support both direct and opportunity costs of education. Moreover, low-
income households may have to send their children to work to be able to make ends meet. 
Results confirm such a prediction. Estimates show that, for boys and girls, the probability to 
work decreases significantly as household income increases. However, its impact on the 
probability for children to do housework is not significant for boys. An other variable 
highlighting the impact of living standards on child status is the average number of persons per 
room. We find that the higher number of persons by room, the higher is the probability for boys 
to do housework and to work.  In contrast, this has no significant impact on the probability for 
girls to work. 
  Our investigations also focus on the impact of having basic services and facilities like 
electric/gas cooker, electric lighting and direct access to water within the household. It turns out 
that these variables have significant impacts on child status (see tables 4 and 5). Having an 
electric/gas cooker significantly decreases the probability to do housework for boys and girls. 
This is understandable given that in households without an electric or gas cooker, meals are 
prepared basically with woods or charcoal. In these households, fetching woods or charcoal are 
presumably among children domestic tasks. The presence electric lighting has also a negative 
impact on the probability to work or to do housework for boys and girls; but the impact is not 
significant. Results also indicate that having direct access to a source of water significantly 
decreases the probability to work and to do housework for both boys and girls. Such an effect is 
not surprising for girls owing to the fact that fetching water to a source outside the household is 
a task usually devoted to girls in Senegalese society.  
However, one caveat is worth highlighting in the interpretation of the impact of these 
basic services. Our results could be biased due to some endogeneity. For example, the 
probability of having direct access to water or electricity is likely to be correlated with the 
development of the infrastructures (in particular with education facilities) in the areas where 
household live. In other words, households having direct access to water are likely to live in an 
area where the supply of education is higher. If this is true, the estimated coefficients of the 
impact of direct access to water or electricity on the probability to attend to school are upward 
biased. We should then take into account for this omitted variable bias. One way of correcting 
for that is to include a variable reflecting the development of the infrastructures in the area of 
the household. ESAM does not contain this kind of information directly but it is possible to 
construct a proxy variable that reflects the degree of development of the infrastructure in the 
neighborhood of the household. To do so, we construct a variable indicating the proportion of 
households having a tap by district of census
5. This infrastructure proxy decreases housework 
for girls and work for boys (See Table 6 and 7). Regarding the impact of the presence of basic 
services in the household, having a direct access to water still significantly increases school 
attendance for boys and girls but the magnitude of this impact is now lower than in the previous 
specification. In contrast, the impacts of having an electric or gas cooker and access to electric 
lighting do not differ once we include the infrastructure proxy. 
Our results also indicate that ethnic membership is determinant on child status. Children 
who are Wolof or Lebu have a higher probability to work than those belonging to another ethnic 
group. In contrast, children from Diola ethnic group have a higher probability to attend school. 
We investigated whether these ethnic differences are related to differences in the access to the 
                                                 
5 The district of census contains between 14 and 24 surveyed households in ESAM. 
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resources (luxury axiom effect) or to the educational facilities (accessibility effect). But there is 
no evidence, which indicates that. In fact, this result reflects cultural differences in attitudes vis-
à-vis child activities in Senegalese society. It is worth stressing that cultural norms and social 
perception about the value of schooling are prominent determinants of children outcomes 
(Bachmann, 2000). 
In our estimations, we also look at the impact of living arrangements of Senegalese 
households on children’s status. Our expectations were that the presence of very young children 
in the household might reduce school attendance and work among older children in order to take 
care of them. However, estimated results show that this is not strongly verified. The presence of 
young children (0 to 5 year-old) in the household has almost no impact on child status. 
Apparently, older children do not have a role of child minders. Furthermore, we look at what is 
the impact of the number of adults in the household on children outcomes. A naive prediction 
would certainly consider that this would have a positive impact on the probability for children to 
attend school. The intuition is grounded on the idea that more adults are present to take care of 
young children and to provide sufficient resources to the household. However, our results are 
not conclusive. On one part, estimates indicate that the number of adults and elderly 
significantly decreases the probability for boys and girls to work. Does this implicate that there 
is labor substitution between adults and children? Presumably not. Estimates, on the other part, 
show that children have a higher probability to work than to attend school when the number of 
adult workers in the household increases. Moreover, the number of adult workers decreases the 
probability for boys to do housework. Results suggest thus labor complementarities between 
adults and children (descriptive statistics indicate that most working children are family 
helpers). This must be explained by the fact that most adult workers evolve in the rural or 
informal sectors where child labor is very involving.  
In our estimations, we also investigate of women’s relative power on children activities. 
The descriptive statistics in Table 2 suggest that working children live in household with a 
higher women’s bargaining power. However, once we control for household characteristics in 
our model, we find that coefficients related to women’s relative power for housework and work 
are negative and significant for both boys and girls. This means that, ceteris paribus, the 
probability for boys and girls to go to school increases with women’s power. Such a result is 
partly conform to the findings of Basu (2001) and Basu and Ray (2001). It has also an important 
policy implication. It suggests that to curb child labor and increases child schooling, policy 
action should favor women empowerment.    
 
4.2 Marginal effects 
The results presented above show the direction of the impact of the explanatory 
variables on the different outcomes but not their magnitudes. Without this information, it is 
difficult to fully appreciate the different determinants of child activities in Senegal. Marginal 
effects can help evaluating these magnitudes and show the impact of a marginal change in the 
explanatory variable on the different estimated probabilities associated to child time use. Table 
8 and 9 present the marginal effects of the multinomial logit model used in this analysis. They 
are calculated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. 
For boys, the probability to attend school, to do housework or to work is 66.2%, 14.9% 
and 18.9%, respectively. For girls, these probabilities are 45.7%, 46.6% and 7.7%, respectively. 
If the household head has a secondary or higher education level, the probability to attend school 
increases by 25.1 percentage points while the probability to work decreases by 17.0 for boys. 
The impact of education of household head on school attendance is even stronger for girls with 
a 36.4% increase of probability at the expense of housework when household head has a 
secondary or higher degree. These results highlight the importance of the education of the 
parents on child status.  
We noticed earlier that the distribution of children between schooling and working 
activities reverses, as they grow older. Marginal effects confirm the negative impact of age on 
school attendance. However the magnitude of such an impact differs between girls and boys  
(9.1 versus 6.4%). It is also worth noting a gender difference in post-school activities. Almost   9
all the boys who drop out from school go to the labor market while two-third of girls do 
housework. 
Let us now consider the marginal effects of household poverty status. We already saw 
that for boys and girls, higher household income is associated with a lower probability to work 
and a higher probability to attend school. The marginal effects confirm such income impacts. 
However, they tend to be moderate as household adult income increases (see Figure 1). This can 
be explained by the following reasons: First, we have included in our model several variables 
reflecting the quality of the living conditions of the household, which are positively correlated 
to household income. This automatically attenuates the household income impact on child status 
compared to other findings that do not include such variables. Second, a large part of working 
children live in an agricultural family in which it is difficult to evaluate the contribution of each 
individual to household income and particularly for the children who help their parents. As a 
consequence, this endogeneity issue can downward bias the impact of household income on the 
probability to work for children. Compared to deprivation indicators, household income has a 
relatively small impact on children time. For instance, having a direct access to water, hugely 
and significantly, increases boys and girls school enrolment by 12.6 and 15.8 %, respectively, at 
the expense of working or doing housework.  
Tables 10 and 11 presents the marginal effects of the presence of basic services in the 
household once we include the infrastructure proxy. Two points are worth emphasizing. The 
first is that the level of development of the infrastructure has significant positive effects on the 
probability to attend to school: a 10-points of percentage increase in the proportion of household 
having a tap in the district of census increases school attendance by 1% for boys and 2.6% for 
girls. This highlights the importance of the infrastructures in school enrolment in Senegal. The 
second point is related to the impact of a direct access to a current source of water. This affects 
positively and significantly the probability for boys and girls to attend school (by 10%), but the 
size of that impact is lower when we control for the development of the infrastructures than 
when we do not. 
Marginal effects indicate also that the presence of children below 9 years old within the 
household has almost no significant impact on children activities. This allows us to confirm our 
finding that older children do not have a role of child minders. In contrast, the presence of adult 
workers affects significantly children’s time use. An additional working adult increases the 
probability to work by 6.4 percentage points for boys and 4.5 points for girls. Marginal effects 
clearly suggest that child and adult labor are complementary.  
We also notice that being Diola increases the probability to attend school by 18.5 
percentage points at the expense of the probability to work and to do housework for boys. For 
girls, the impact is an increasing probability to attend school (by 15.6 percentage points) at the 
expense of doing housework.   
Regarding the living areas, the probability to attend school is the lowest for boys and 
girls living in rural area. Compared to the urban area, the probability to attend school decreases 
by 13.3 percentage points in rural area for boys and 19.3 for girls.  
Marginal effects of women’s bargaining power regarding child activities are quite 
important (see Figure 2). For boys, a 10% increase in women’s bargaining power is associated 
to 1.5% increase in the probability to attend school at the expense of work (-1%) and housework 
(-0.5%). For girls, a similar increase raises the probability to attend school by 0.8% at the 
expense of work (-0.3%) and housework (-0.5%) but these marginal effects are not significant. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Understanding why a Senegalese child is doing one activity and not another one has 
been the principal motivation of this paper. Using data from the most reliable Senegalese 
household survey (Esam-I), we test the impact of household living standard and living 
arrangements, parental background, the presence of basic services, adult activities, gender 
balance of power and ethnic differences on children outcomes. Among some of the main 
interesting results is that household living standard significantly affects children involvement in 
the different types of activities. When household adult income increases, the probability for 
boys and girls to work decreases significantly while their enrolment in school increases, as   10
predicted by the luxury axiom. However, this impact tends to be modest. In contrast, 
household’s adult income does not have significant impact on the probability for children to do 
housework. We observe that the probability of doing housework changes with the presence or 
not of basic services, especially for girls: children living in households having direct access to 
water, electric/gas cooker are less likely to devote most of their time to housework even if we 
control for the development of infrastructure in the area where the household lives. This 
highlights the importance of opportunity costs of schooling in non-pecuniary form especially for 
girls. Direct access to water also increases school attendance at the expense of work for boys.   
A result of this paper that is worth being emphasized is that women’s power affects 
significantly children activities. We find that as women’s power increases, Senegalese children 
are less likely to do housework or to work while their probability to attend school increase. 
We also observe that adult background has a significant impact on children activities. 
Children in a household where the head has a relatively high level of education are less likely to 
participate in the labor market or to do housework and more likely to attend school. This impact 
likely points to the importance of adult education on children outcomes. Our results indicate that 
cultural and social norms matter a lot in household decisions to send children to school or to 
work. Therefore, educating the adults could be useful in improving children outcomes. 
To recap, evidence from this paper indicates that building new school, improving school 
quality, subsidizing school, banning child labor or making compulsory school attendance are 
not sufficient to improve schooling and curb child labor in Senegal. Greater emphasis should 
also be put on access to basic services and facilities like current water (to decrease the 
opportunity cost of schooling), on women empowerment in terms of access to resources, 
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Table 1: Activity distribution, by region, sex and age (1994-95) 
Age   Boys      G i r l s   
       Urban      
 School Housework Work   School Housework Work 
10 87.2%  10.0%  2.8%    76.7%  21.7%  1.6% 
11 81.1%  14.6%  4.3%    73.3%  23.8%  2.9% 
12  76.6%  12.7%  10.7%  63.5%  32.0%  4.6% 
13  74.2%  13.5%  12.3%  56.3%  36.9%  6.7% 
14  61.6%  13.4%  25.0%  47.8%  44.7%  7.5% 
15  52.9%  14.7%  32.4%  35.4%  45.0%  19.6% 
All  ages  72.8%  13.1%  14.1%  58.2%  34.4%  7.4% 
             
      Rural     
 School Housework Work   School Housework Work 
10  46.0%  19.6%  34.5%  30.7%  48.0%  21.2% 
11  33.5%  20.6%  45.8%  24.3%  53.4%  22.3% 
12  45.6%  11.8%  42.6%  25.4%  46.7%  27.8% 
13  37.4%  19.5%  43.2%  22.7%  40.2%  37.1% 
14  36.0%  9.9%  54.0%  22.2%  44.9%  32.9% 
15  25.4% 13.9% 60.7%    8.8%  55.3% 35.8% 









Table 2: Distribution of occupation among working children, by region and sex (1994-95) 
 Urban Rural 
  Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Family  helper  24.6% 19.4% 86.6% 82.2% 
Apprentice 70.4%  13.9%  2.0%  0.0% 
Other  4.9%  66.7% 11.4% 17.8% 



















Table 3: Descriptive statistics for 10 to 15 year-old children in Senegal (1994-95) 
 Boys  Girls 
 Total  School
Housewor
k Work Total  School 
Housewor
k Work
Number of observations  2543  1466  366  711  2408  1066  959  383 
             
Education of household head:             
None  72% 60%  86% 91%  72% 53%  85% 90% 
Primary  14% 18%  8%  7%  14% 21%  10%  8% 
Secondary  14% 22%  6%  2%  14% 26%  5%  2% 
  100% 100%  100% 100% 100% 100%  100% 100%
             
Age of children  12.41  12.17  12.34  12.94 12.52  12.11  12.75  13.07 
             
Living conditions:             
Gas/electric  cooker  22% 31%  12% 10%  25% 37%  18%  7% 
Electric  lighting  40% 55%  30% 15%  41% 61%  30% 13% 
Direct access to water  44%  58%  32%  19%  46%  67%  33%  21% 
Number of persons per room  2.77  2.71  3.01  2.77  2.82  2.73  3.00  2.63 
             
Ethnic group:             
Wolof/Lebu  44% 42%  38% 50%  45% 44%  44% 49% 
Pular  21% 17%  33% 23%  24% 19%  32% 16% 
Sereer  14% 14%  16% 13%  13% 13%  11% 16% 
Diola  6% 8%  1% 2%  5% 8%  2% 3% 
Other/n.a.  16% 18%  12% 13%  14% 16%  11% 16% 
  100% 100%  100% 100% 100% 100%  100% 100%
             
Rural  area  44% 29%  49% 71%  39% 20%  47% 72% 
             
Living arrangement :             
Children  0_5  2.58 2.48  2.63 2.74  2.48 2.38  2.49 2.72 
Children  6_9  1.90 1.84  1.82 2.06  1.76 1.78  1.71 1.79 
Children10_15  3.31 3.31  3.28 3.31  2.97 3.19  2.80 2.79 
Men  16_54  2.51 2.58  2.36 2.44  2.43 2.65  2.25 2.26 
Women  16_54  3.19 3.22  3.11 3.17  3.06 3.23  2.90 2.99 
Men  55+  0.45 0.41  0.53 0.48  0.43 0.41  0.44 0.45 
Women  55+  0.48 0.48  0.49 0.49  0.46 0.45  0.44 0.52   14
Household size  14.42 14.32  14.22 14.69 13.59 14.09  13.03 13.52 
             
             
Number of workers (16+)  3.56  3.14  2.87  4.78  3.51  3.20  3.26  5.02 
             
Household income/10000 
(CFA)  339.1 408.4  354.7 188.2 309.3 422.6  240.1 167.3 
(Household income-children 
income)/10000  (CFA)  338.2 407.9  354.2 186.3 308.1 421.7  239.4 164.1 
             




Table 4. Multinomial logit estimates for 10 to 15 year-old boys in Senegal (1994-95) 
  School  Housework Work 
  Reference  Coefficient Std error  Coefficient Std error 
Intercept  -  -1,813 1,022*  -2,425 0,966** 
         
Education of household 
head: 
 
     
None  -  -   -  
Primary  -  -0,678 0,224***  -0,557 0,201*** 
Secondary  -  -1,049 0,260***  -1,757 0,321*** 
         
Age of children  -  0,120 0,038***  0,415 0,036*** 




-0,031 0,064  -0,254 0,060*** 
         
Gas/electric cooker  -  -0,717 0,219***  0,160 0,211 
Electric lighting  -  -0,308 0,195  -0,324 0,203 
Direct access to water  -  -0,473 0,170***  -0,652 0,161*** 
Number of persons by room  -  0,147 0,045***  0,148 0,046*** 
         
Ethnic group:         
Wolof/Lebu  -  -   -  
Pular  -  0,471 0,176***  0,209 0,174 
Sereer  -  -0,115 0,204  -0,996 0,195*** 
Diola  -  -0,979 0,536*  -1,023 0,401** 
Other/n.a.  -  -0,198 0,216  -0,880 0,209*** 
         
Rural area  -  0,220 0,199  0,866 0,194*** 
         
Living arrangement :         
Children 0_5  -  -0,033 0,041  -0,075 0,037** 
Children 6_9  -  -0,068 0,051  -0,058 0,047 
Children10_15  -  -0,028 0,037  -0,055 0,036 
Men 16_54  -  0,076 0,043*  -0,150 0,046*** 
Women 16_54  -  0,035 0,044  -0,109 0,044** 
Men 55+  -  0,197 0,113*  -0,121 0,113 
Women 55+  -  -0,029 0,101  -0,253 0,095*** 
           15
Number of workers (16+)  -  -0,076 0,036**  0,405 0,038*** 
         
Women’s bargaining power  -  -0,591 0,184***  -0,752 0,169*** 
Number of observations  1466  366  711 
Note : The sign  « - » means that the variable refers to the intercept. 
*      means that the estimate is significant at 10% level. 
**    means that the estimate is significant at 5% level. 
***  means that the estimate is significant at 1% level.  






Table 5:  Multinomial logit estimates for 10 to 15 year-old girls in Senegal (1994-95) 
  School  Housework Work 
  Reference  Coefficient Std  error  Coefficient  Std error 
Intercept  -  -1,444 0,909  -2,330 1,314* 
         
Education of household 
head: 
 
     
None  -  -   -  
Primary  -  -0,730 0,157***  -0,587 0,259** 
Secondary  -  -1,536 0,191***  -1,913 0,438*** 
         
Age of children  -  0,331 0,032***  0,569 0,048*** 




-0,127 0,059**  -0,353 0,083*** 
         
Gas/electric cooker  -  -0,387 0,154**  -0,673 0,303** 
Electric lighting  -  -0,187 0,156  -0,185 0,268 
Direct access to water  -  -0,643 0,131***  -0,615 0,204*** 
Number of persons by room  -  0,155 0,035***  0,050 0,061 
         
Ethnic group:         
Wolof/Lebu  -  -   -  
Pular  -  -0,108 0,147  -0,588 0,254** 
Sereer  -  -0,988 0,186***  -0,449 0,245* 
Diola  -  -0,867 0,327***  0,218 0,485 
Other/n.a.  -  -0,522 0,178***  -0,309 0,273 
         
Rural area  -  0,781 0,170***  0,883 0,256*** 
         
Living arrangement :         
Children 0_5  -  0,035 0,034  0,011 0,050 
Children 6_9  -  -0,040 0,047  -0,129 0,067* 
Children10_15  -  -0,122 0,036***  -0,103 0,055* 
Men 16_54  -  0,035 0,038  -0,414 0,069*** 
Women 16_54  -  -0,044 0,039  -0,337 0,068*** 
Men 55+  -  -0,046 0,099  -0,529 0,151*** 
Women 55+  -  -0,115 0,093  -0,276 0,130**   16
         
Number of workers (16+)  -  0,054 0,034  0,659 0,059*** 
         
Women’s bargaining power  -  -0,296 0,153*  -0,528 0,219** 
Number of observations :  1066  959  383 
Note : The sign  « - » means that the variable refers to the intercept. 
*      means that the estimate is significant at 10% level. 
**    means that the estimate is significant at 5% level. 
***  means that the estimate is significant at 1% level.  





Table 6:  Multinomial logit estimates for 10 to 15 year-old boys in Senegal (1994-95) 
  School  Housework  Work 
  Reference  dy/dx  Std error  dy/dx  Std error 
Gas/electric cooker  -  -0,721 0,219***  0,127 0,212 
Electric lighting  -  -0,290 0,199  -0,242 0,206 
Direct access to water  -  -0,445 0,183**  -0,488 0,176*** 
Proportion of 
household having a tap 
in the district of census  -  -0,131 0,329  -0,739 0,324** 
Rural











Table 7:  Multinomial logit estimates for 10 to 15 year-old girls in Senegal (1994-95) 
  School  Housework  Work 
  Reference  dy/dx  Std error  dy/dx  Std error 
Gas/electric cooker  -  -0,386 0,155**  -0,670 0,304** 
Electric lighting  -  -0,054 0,159  -0,098 0,274 
Direct access to water  -  -0,389 0,144***  -0,463 0,219** 
Proportion of household 
having a tap in the 
district of census  -  -1,121 0,263***  -0,686 0,448 
Rural

























Table 8: Marginal effects on the probability to attend school, do housework or work  
               for   boys 
 School  Housework  Work 
  0.662 0.149 0.189 
 dy/dx  Std error dy/dx  Std error  dy/dx Std  error 
           
Education of household head:           
None
  -   -   -   
Primary
1  0,125  0,030*** -0,063 0,021***  -0,063 0,024*** 
Secondary
1  0,251  0,027*** -0,081 0,021***  -0,170 0,020*** 
           
Age of children  -0,064  0,007*** 0,003  0,005  0,060  0,005*** 
           
Log(hh income-child income)  0,035  0,011*** 0,003  0,008  -0,038  0,009*** 
           
Gas/electric cooker
1 0,039  0,037  -0,083  0,020***  0,044  0,035 
Electric lighting
1  0,070  0,034**  -0,030 0,023  -0,040 0,029 
Direct access to water
1  0,126  0,028*** -0,041 0,020**  -0,085 0,023*** 
Number of persons by room  -0,033  0,008*** 0,014  0,005***  0,019  0,007*** 
           
Ethnic group:           
Wolof/Lebu  -   -   -   
Pular
1  -0,076  0,034** 0,058  0,025** 0,017  0,026 
Sereer
1 0,112  0,031*** 0,007  0,026  -0,119  0,018*** 
Diola
1  0,185  0,049*** -0,080 0,038**  -0,105 0,035*** 
Other/n.a.
 1  0,113  0,033*** -0,005 0,026  -0,108 0,021*** 
           
Rural area
1  -0,133  0,036*** 0,002 0,024  0,131 0,031*** 
           
Living arrangement :           
Children  0_5  0,013  0,007*  -0,002 0,005  -0,011 0,005* 
Children  6_9  0,014  0,009 -0,007  0,006 -0,007  0,007 
Children10_15  0,010  0,007 -0,002  0,005 -0,008  0,005 
Men 16_54  0,011  0,008  0,014  0,005***  -0,025  0,007*** 
Women 16_54  0,010  0,008  0,007  0,005  -0,018  0,007*** 
Men 55+  -0,004  0,020  0,028  0,014**  -0,024  0,017 
Women 55+  0,034  0,018**  0,003  0,012  -0,038  0,014*** 
           
Number of workers (16+)  -0,043  0,007*** -0,021  0,004***  0,064  0,006***   18
           
Women’s  bargaining  power  0,152  0,032*** -0,054 0,022**  -0,099 0,025*** 
Note : The sign  « - » means that the variable refers to the intercept. 
*      means that the estimate is significant at 10% level. 
**    means that the estimate is significant at 5% level. 
***  means that the estimate is significant at 1% level. 
 







Table 9: Marginal effects on the probability to attend school, do housework or work  
               for girls 
  School  Housework  Work 
  0,457 0,466 0,077 
  dy/dx  Std error dy/dx  Std error  dy/dx Std  error 
           
Education of household head:           
None           
Primary
1  0,175  0,036*** -0,158 0,034***  -0,017 0,015 
Secondary
1  0,364  0,034*** -0,300 0,033***  -0,064 0,013*** 
           
Age of children  -0,091  0,008*** 0,062  0,007***  0,029  0,003*** 
           
Log(hh  income-child  income)  0,040  0,014*** -0,019 0,013  -0,021 0,006*** 
           
Gas/electric cooker
1  0,106  0,037*** -0,074 0,036**  -0,031 0,017* 
Electric lighting
1  0,046  0,037 -0,040  0,037 -0,006  0,018 
Direct access to water
1  0,158  0,031*** -0,137 0,030***  -0,021 0,013 
Number of persons by room  -0,035  0,008*** 0,037  0,008***  -0,002  0,004 
           
Ethnic group:           
Wolof/Lebu           
Pular
1  0,042  0,036 -0,008  0,034 -0,034  0,013** 
Sereer
1  0,219  0,041*** -0,216 0,036***  -0,003 0,015 
Diola
1 0,156  0,073**  -0,207  0,062***  0,051  0,050 
Other/n.a.
 1  0,122  0,042*** -0,117 0,039***  -0,005 0,017 
           
Rural area
1  -0,193  0,038*** 0,158 0,038***  0,035 0,018* 
           
Living arrangement :           
Children  0_5  -0,008  0,008 0,008  0,008 0,000  0,003 
Children  6_9  0,013  0,011 -0,005  0,011 -0,008  0,004* 
Children10_15  0,030  0,009*** -0,027 0,008***  -0,003 0,004 
Men 16_54  0,007  0,009  0,024  0,009***  -0,031  0,005*** 
Women 16_54  0,021  0,009**  0,001  0,009  -0,022  0,004*** 
Men 55+  0,028  0,024  0,008  0,023  -0,036  0,010*** 
Women  55+  0,034  0,022 -0,019  0,021 -0,016  0,008*   19
           
Number of workers (16+)  -0,035  0,008*** -0,010  0,008  0,045  0,004*** 
           
Women’s  bargaining  power  0,082  0,037**  -0,055 0,035  -0,027 0,014* 
Note : The sign  « - » means that the variable refers to the intercept. 
*      means that the estimate is significant at 10% level. 
**    means that the estimate is significant at 5% level. 
***  means that the estimate is significant at 1% level. 
 




























































Figure 2: Estimated probability of the different outcomes according to women’s 
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Table 10: Marginal effects on the probability to attend school, do housework or work 
                 for boys 
  School  Housework  Work 
  dy/dx  Std error  dy/dx  Std error  dy/dx Std  error 
Gas/electric cooker
1  0,044 0,037  -0,082 0,020***  0,038 0,034 
Electric lighting
1  0,058 0,035*  -0,030 0,024  -0,029 0,030 
Direct access to water
1  0,103 0,031***  -0,042 0,022*  -0,061 0,025** 
Proportion of household 
having a tap in the 
district of census  0,105 0,058*  0,004 0,041  -0,109 0,048** 
Rural
1  -0,106 0,039***  0,004 0,026  0,102 0,032*** 
Note : The sign  « - » means that the variable refers to the intercept. 
*      means that the estimate is significant at 10% level. 
**    means that the estimate is significant at 5% level. 
***  means that the estimate is significant at 1% level. 
 









Table 11: Marginal effects on the probability to attend school, do housework or work  
                 for girls 
 School  Housework  Work 
 dy/dx  Std error  dy/dx  Std error  dy/dx Std  error 
Gas/electric cooker
1  0,106 0,037***  -0,074 0,036**  -0,031 0,017* 
Electric lighting
1 0,015  0,038 -0,010  0,037 -0,005  0,018 
Direct access to water
1  0,099 0,034***  -0,080 0,033**  -0,019 0,014 
Proportion of household 
having a tap in the 
district of census  0,263  0,063*** -0,254  0,062*** -0,009  0,030 
Rural
1  -0,143  0,041*** 0,109  0,041*** 0,034  0,020* 
Note : The sign  « - » means that the variable refers to the intercept. 
*      means that the estimate is significant at 10% level. 
**    means that the estimate is significant at 5% level. 
***  means that the estimate is significant at 1% level. 
 
1 dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 














Table 4(continued): Multinomial logit results for boys (regional dummies) 
 School  Housework  Work 
  Reference  Coefficient Std error  Coefficient Std error 
Kolda  -  -0,300 0,349  -0,234 0,324 
Dakar   -  -   -  
Ziguinchor  -  -1,066 0,424**  -1,154 0,407*** 
Diourbel  -  -0,200 0,329  0,294 0,279 
Saint-Louis  -  -0,010 0,240  -0,576 0,266** 
Tambacounda  -  -0,027 0,445  1,043 0,367*** 
Kaolack  -  -0,009 0,263  0,262 0,257 
Thies  -  0,259 0,231  0,397 0,226* 
Louga  -  0,236 0,318  0,466 0,295 









Table 5(continued): Multinomial logit results for girls (regional dummies) 
 School Housework Work 
  Reference  Coefficient Std  error  Coefficient  Std error 
Kolda  -  0,217 0,348  0,916 0,459** 
Dakar   -  -   -  
Ziguinchor  -  -0,980 0,298***  -1,734 0,520*** 
Diourbel  -  0,441 0,267*  -0,169 0,415 
Saint-Louis  -  -0,037 0,209  -0,757 0,401 
Tambacounda  -  -0,146 0,333  0,469 0,451 
Kaolack  -  -0,776 0,231***  0,282 0,331 
Thies  -  -0,027 0,191  -0,362 0,338 
Louga  -  -0,133 0,278  -0,063 0,400 
Fatick  -  -0,842 0,279***  -0,560 0,405 
 